Chinese Participation in the Acceleration of Reform of Indonesian political Cult

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As a consequence of the political repression and discrimination as well as the cronyism instituted by the new Order Regime, there has been a stereotype in Indonesian society that the ethnic Chinese are simply egoistic "economic animals" who do not care about the well-being of the people and the country. This stereotype is one of the stigmas borne by the ethnic Chinese. Another stigma that has been extremely effective in repressing the ethnic Chinese so as to make them avoid politics is the Baperki/Communist stigma. In the aftermath of the G30S/PKI so-called abortive coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia) during which all leftist elements were brutally purged in Indonesia, the new Order military regime carried out repressive measures to arrest and persecute political figures, activists, party cadres and members of various Chinese organisations accused of having Baperki/Communist affiliations. The same applied to various organisations, associations and foundations linked to the Chinese that were dissolved and banned. Thousands of ex-Baperki and Chinese schools as well as buildings owned by Chinese organisations were confiscated and converted to military lodging facilities or state schools, there were even those turned into homes for military officials or shophouses and other commercial complexes. [1] The anti-Chinese repressive measures implemented by the military regime was in fulfillment of the China Containment Policy of Capitalist Western countries to counter the so-called "Communist threat" from the North that was identified as the People's Republic of China. From an early stage during Sukarno's presidency elements of the Indonesian military, particularly the army had been attempting to carry out anti-Chinese/China activities to divert the attention of the Indonesian people from their struggle against Anglo Saxon (US and Great Britain) imperialism. One of their main activities was to spread anti-Chinese/China propaganda actively and intensively. They tried to manipulate Indonesian public opinion by trying to convince the Indonesians that their true enemy was not the West but Communist China and that the Chinese in Indonesia were a fifth column of the PRC. [2] It is important to remember that at that time the Vietnam War that the Americans started was at its peak. In the meantime, LPKB (Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa: Institution for the Establishment of National Unity), an army-sponsored organisation set up by Dutch-educated Peranakan Chinese to foster assimilation of the Chinese into indigenous Indonesian society, regarded the G30S incident as a starting point for which to deal their political rivals a final blow. LPBK played an active and important role in scapegoating the Socialist Chinese organisation Baperki and carried out a systematic campaign to eliminate it. In accordance with the CIA and MI6 programme to eradicate all leftist and left-leaning elements in Indonesia, Baperki had been accused of being an extension of the Indonesian Communist Party. All of a sudden in 1965, the entire Indonesian mass media which had passed through screening by the army was authorised to republish and carry out anti-Chinese and anti-PRC propaganda. All members of the Baperki leadership and other Chinese political figures were pursued and arrested by the army which extorted a great sum of money from them. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese, perhaps over a million Chinese, were massacred by the army along with army-backed vigilante squads consisting of armed civilians, this massacre costing over a million lives and which was not limited to the Chinese would have not been possible without CIA and MI6 death lists of suspected Communists, Leftists and miscellaneous groups linked to the Indonesian Communist Party and/or mainland China supplied by the local American and British embassies. Many forms of restrictions were imposed on the ethnic Chinese, starting from the prohibition on Chinese culture, rituals, religious beliefs in public as well as the ban on Mandarin and Chinese characters. A most effective measure to psychologically emasculate the Chinese was the enactment of a governmental order replacing the respective form of address for China and the Chinese as Tiongkok (Zhongguo) and Tionghoa (Zhonghua) with the perjorative term "Cina", as a result of this the military regime succeeded to make the Chinese politically and psychologically helpless. All these developed into longstanding traumatic symptoms which was why during the new Order Era (1965-1998), the ethnic Chinese in general avoided politics at all costs. Even now, after five years since the fall of the new Order Regime, most Chinese are reluctant out of traumatic fear to be involved in practical politics. However the business flair of military officers in their efforts to generate wealth following the example of the Dutch colonisers led them to cultivate a group of Chinese business cronies affiliated with the KMT regime in Taiwan who served as the military regime's financial managers in a business environment rampant with corruption, cronyism and nepotism. Many of these cronies with their private armies from their Gongsi (enterprises or conglomerate business empires) abetted the army in tandem with spies sent from Taiwan in the massacre of fellow Chinese who were oriented to the Dalu motherland. Unfortunately, to make matter worse, these opportunistic Chinese capitalists forgot who they were and enriched themselves without any qualms about ethics, morals and compassion, thus came into fruition the negative stigma in Indonesian society that all Chinese are corrupt, rapaciously greedy and nothing but "economic animals". Moreover, other than making use of a group of American-educated indigenous Indonesian technocrats known as the "Berkeley Mafia" as well as seeking the aid of international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, ADB etcetera and establishing IGGI, the military regime was actually very pragmatic in taking advantage of a good number of Chinese who were as a matter of fact very experienced in trade, commerce and finance and were part of a worldwide overseas Chinese business network, this enabled the military regime to improve the economy in the real sector. The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were encouraged to enter business and at the same time were restricted to it so as to prevent them from being active in other fields as they were prior to 1965. Explicitly as well as implicitly, they were discouraged (even threatened) to enter politics and restrictions in the form of quotas and glass ceilings were placed on Chinese entering the civil service and the military. Due to the discriminative anti-Chinese policies of the new Order Regime that lasted for more than three decades, the Chinese gradually distanced themselves from politics and concentrated on the business sector. This was a condition created during the new Orde Regime era which resulted in the public misperception that the Chinese only acted for the sake of self interests by accumulating wealth and sanctioning any means whatsover to achieve an end. Nonetheless, honestly speaking, since many centuries past the Chinese have been playing a predominant and determinant role in all fields of life ranging from politics, the economy, social life, arts and culture, journalism, literature, sports, diplomacy, religion and also in the armed struggle to free the East Indies from the Dutch and guerilla warfare against the Japanese Imperial Army during the Japanese occupation. [3] The political Role of the ethnic Chinese in the post New Order Period The 13-15 May Tragedy in 1998 struck another traumatic chord in all Chinese throughout Indonesia and made them realise that they have been marginalised and emasculated for too long. Most of their rights as Indonesian citizens were not accorded to them and as suspected Communists and PRC fifth columnists they were always scapgoated and subjected to extortion to the powers that be. Their sense of self-esteem as Chinese, and even as human beings had been violated. The only freedom they had under the new Order Regime period was in business which helped to increase the living standards and the education of many Chinese, however without political emancipation such material comfort is meaningless. The 13-15 May anti-Chinese pogroms proved that the ethnic Chinese who controlled most of the Indonesian economy, were actually politically powerless and within a matter of hours, they were made helpless. Immediately after the fall of the new Order Regime in May 1998, various Chinese organisations and political parties were established. The 13-15 May 1998 Tragedy and the new Order Regime's fall from grace was an important momentum for the resurgence of Indonesia's ethnic Chinese in tandem with the Indonesian's people reawakening in their struggle for justice and democracy. Out of spontaneity and spirit, nothing much nothing more, however deficient in political experience and organisation as well as a lack of skilled leaders of high integrity, these organisations and political parties emerged out of the dark with their slogans and jargon of democracy and reformation. During the 1999 general elections, only one Chinese party (PBI) passed the selection test of the General Election Commission (KPU) and took part in the elections. The calculations made by the founders and the leadership of PBI were erroneous, they assumed in confidence that they would receive the support of the majority of the Chinese community in Indonesia whose number amounted to almost 10 million people. Thus, according to their assumption, at least 5-10 seats would be won in the DPR-RI (Indonesian Parliament). In reality, the PBI only attained one seat (L.T. Susanto who represents West Kalimantan where the mostly Hakka Chinese form a majority). Does one seat in parliement ensure that one can realise the aspirations and the interes